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     Abstract— A mobile ad hoc network (MANETs) is a self-
organizing system of mobile nodes that communicate with 
each other via wireless links with no fixed infrastructure or 
centralized administration such as base station or access 
points. Nodes in a MANETs operate both as host as well as 
routers to forward packets for each other in a multi-hop 
fashion.  For many applications in wireless networks, 
multicasting is an important and frequent communication 
service. By multicasting, since a single message can be 
delivered to multiple receivers simultaneously.  It greatly 
reduces the transmission cost when sending the same packet 
to multiple recipients.  
    The security issue of MANETs in group communications 
is even more challenging because of involvement of multiple 
senders and multiple receivers.  At that time of multicasting, 
mobile ad hoc network are unprotected by the attacks of 
malicious nodes because of vulnerabilities of routing 
protocols. Some of the attacks are Rushing attack, Blackhole 
attack, Sybil attack, Neighbor attack and Jellyfish attack.  
    This paper is based on Rushing attack. In Rushing attack, 
the attacker exploits the duplicate suppression mechanism 
by quickly forwarding route discovery packets in order to 
gain access to the forwarding group and this will affect the 
Average Attack Success Rate. 
    In this paper, the goal is to measure the impact of 
Rushing attack and their node positions which affect the 
performance metrics of Average Attack Success Rate with 
respect to three scenarios: near sender, near receiver and 
anywhere within the network. The performance of the 
Attack Success Rate with respect to above three scenarios is 
also compared. 
 
Index Terms—Multicast, Rushing attack, MANETs, 
Security, Multicast, attack strategies, Security threats, 
Attacks on Multicast. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A mobile ad hoc network is a self-organizing system of 
mobile nodes that communicate with each other via 
wireless links with no infrastructure or centralized 
administration such as base stations or access points. 
Nodes in MANET operate both as hosts as well as routers 
to forward packets for each other in a multi-hop fashion. 
MANETSs are suitable for applications in which no 
infrastructure exists such as military battlefield, 
emergency rescue, vehicular communications and mining 
operations. 
In these applications, communication and collaboration 
among a given group of nodes are necessary. Instead of 
using multiple unicast transmissions, it is advantageous to 
use  multicast in order to save network bandwidth and 
resources,  since a single message can be delivered to 
multiple receivers simultaneously. Existing multicast 
routing protocols in MANETs can be classified into two 
categories: tree based and mesh-based.  In a multicast 
routing tree, there is usually only one single path between 
a sender and a receiver, while in a routing mesh, there 
may be multiple paths between each sender receiver pair. 
Routing meshes are thus suitable than routing trees for 
systems with frequently changing topology such as 
MANETs due to availability of multiple paths between a 
source and a destination. Example tree-based multicast 
routing protocols are MAODV, AMRIS, BEMRP, and 
ADMR. Typically mesh-based multicast routing 
protocols are ODMRP, FGMP, CAMP , DCMP , and 
NSMP [2]. 
Among all the research issues, security is an essential 
requirement in MANET environments. Compared to 
wired networks, MANETs are more vulnerable to 
security attacks due to lack of trusted centralized 
authority, lack of trust relationships between mobile 
nodes, easy eavesdropping because of shared wireless 
medium, dynamic network topology, low bandwidth, and 
battery and memory constraints of mobile devices. The 
security issue of MANETs in group communications is 
even more challenging because of the involvement of 
multiple senders and multiple receivers. Although several 
types of security attacks in MANETs have been studied 
in the literature, the focus of earlier research is on unicast 
(point to point) applications. The impacts of security 
attacks on multicast in MANETs have not yet been 
explored [3]. 
In this paper, we present a simulation-based study of 
the effects of Rushing attack on multicast in MANETs. 
We consider the most common types of attacks, namely 
rushing attack, blackhole attack, neighbor attack and 
jellyfish attack. 
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 A. Goal 
   The goal of this paper is to impact of rushing attack on 
mesh-based multicast in MANETs. The rushing attack, 
that acts as an effective denial-of-service attack against 
all currently proposed on-demand ad hoc network routing 
protocols, including protocols that were designed to be 
secure. [2] 
   In this work, to simulate three scenarios: The attacker 
node is place at near sender, the attacker node is place at 
near receiver. The attacker node is place anywhere within 
the MANETs. Based on above scenarios, to simulate how 
the Rushing attack affects the network performance. 
 B. Reading Roadmap  
 
    This paper starts with this section, which gives a brief 
introduction, and goal of this paper. Section 2 describes 
preliminaries for multicast attacks in MANETs. The 
Improved model scheme Impact of Rushing Attack on 
Multicast in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (IRAMA) is 
presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the 
experimental results and discussion. Finally, conclusions 
are given in Section 5. 
II.  MULTICAST AND ITS ATTACKS IN MOBILE AD 
HOC NETWORK  
A. Introduction  
    A mobile ad hoc network (MANETs) is a self-
organizing system of mobile nodes that communicate 
with each other via wireless links with no fixed 
infrastructure or centralized administration such as base 
station or access points.  Nodes in a MANETs operate 
both as host as well as routers to forward packets for each 
other in a multi-hop fashion.  For many applications in 
wireless networks, multicasting is an important and 
frequent communication service.  By multicasting, since a 
single message can be delivered to multiple receivers 
simultaneously.  It greatly reduces the transmission cost 
when sending the same packet to multiple recipients [4, 
5].  
     Multicast is communication between a single sender 
and multiple receivers on a network. Otherwise it 
transmits a single message to a select group of recipients. 
Multicast is used, for example, in streaming video, in 
which many megabytes of data are sent over the network. 
Single packets copied by the network and sent to a 
specific subset of network addresses. These addresses are 
specified in the Destination Address. Protocol to allow 
point to multipoint efficient distribution of packets, 
frequently used in access grid applications. It greatly 
reduces the transmission cost when sending the same 
packet to multiple recipients. The option to multicast was 
made possible by digital technology to allow each digital 
broadcast station to split its bit stream into 2, 3, 4 or more 
individual channels of programming and/or data services. 
    Instead of using multiple unicast transmissions, it is 
advantageous to use multicast in order to save bandwidth 
and resources. Since a single message can be delivered to 
multiple receivers simultaneously. Multicast data may 
still be delivered to the destination on alternative paths 
even when the route breaks. It is typically used to refer to 
IP multicast which is often employed for streaming media 
and At the Data Link Layer, multicast describes one-to-
many distribution such as Ethernet multicast addressing, 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) point-to-multipoint 
virtual circuits or Infiniband multicast. Teleconferencing 
and videoconferencing also use multicasting, but require 
more robust protocols and networks. Standards are being 
developed to support multicasting over a TCP/IP network 
such as the Internet. These standards, IP Multicast and 
Mbone, will allow users to easily join multicast groups. 
[6] 
 
B.  Attack against ad hoc network  
 
     While a wireless network is more versatile than a 
wired one, it is also more vulnerable to attacks. This is 
due to the very nature of radio transmissions, which are 
made on the air. On a wired network, an intruder would 
need to break into a machine of the network or to 
physically wiretap a cable. On a wireless network, an 
adversary is able to eavesdrop on all messages within the 
emission area, by operating in promiscuous mode and 
using a packet sniffer (and possibly a directional 
antenna). Furthermore, due to the limitations of the 
medium, communications can easily be perturbed; the 
intruder can perform this attack by keeping the medium 
busy sending its own messages, or just by jamming 
communications with noise. [1] 
     Security has become a primary concern to provide 
protected communication between mobile nodes in a 
hostile environment. Unlike wireline networks, the 
unique characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks pose a 
number of non-trivial challenges to the security design. 
Providing security support for mobile ad-hoc networks is 
challenging for several reasons: (a) wireless networks are 
susceptible to attacks ranging from passive 
eavesdropping to active interfering, occasional break-ins 
by adversaries (b) mobile users demand ―anywhere, 
anytime‖ services; (c) a scalable solution is needed for a 
large-scale mobile network (d) Dynamic topology (e) 
infrastructure less (f) Peer –to-peer network (g) Lack of 
centralized authority [17]. 
 
C  Attacks on Multicast 
 
     Multicast conserves network bandwidth by sending a 
single stream of data to multiple receivers. Packets are 
duplicated only at branch points. The security issue of 
MANETs in group communications is even more 
challenging because of involvement of multiple senders 
and multiple receivers. Some different types of multicast 
attacks are Rushing attack, Balckhole attack, Neighbor 
attack, and Jellyfish attack. 
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D. Rushing Attack 
 
     A rushing attacker exploits this duplicate suppression 
mechanism by quickly forwarding route discovery 
packets in order to gain access to the forwarding group. 
[8] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Rushing Attack 
 Goal: to invade into routing paths 
 Target: multicast routing protocols that use a 
duplicate suppression mechanism in order to 
reduce routing overheads. 
 Method: quickly forwards route discovery 
(control) packets by skipping processing or 
routing steps. Rushing attack otherwise, falsely 
sending malicious control messages and then    
forwards the packet fastly than clear node 
reachable. 
 
E.  BlackHole Attack 
 
     An attacker can drop received routing messages, 
instead of relaying them as the protocol requires, in order 
reducing the quantity of routing information available to 
the other nodes.  
     This is called black hole attack, and is a ―passive‖ and 
a simple way to perform a Denial of Service. The attack 
can be done selectively (drop routing packets for a 
specified destination, a packet every n packets, a packet 
every t seconds, or a randomly selected portion of the 
packets) or in bulk (drop all packets), and may have the 
effect of making the destination node unreachable or 
downgrade communications in the network.  
Message Tampering 
 
      An attacker can also modify the messages originating 
from other nodes before relaying them, if a mechanism 
for message integrity (i.e. a digest of the payload) is not 
utilized.  
      A packet drop attack or black hole attack is a type of 
denial-of-service attack accomplished by dropping 
packets. Black holes refer to places in the network where 
incoming traffic is silently discarded (or "dropped"), 
without informing the source that the data did not reach 
its intended recipients [8,9]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (a). Black Hole Attack (Drop all packets) 
 
 Goal: to damage the packet delivery ratio  
 Target: all multicast protocols 
 Method: an attacker 
o First invades into forwarding group (e.g., by 
using rushing attack), 
 Then drops some or all data packets instead of 
forwarding them 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2(b) Black Hole attack (small amt of data only 
drop) 
Black Hole attacks effects the packet delivery and to 
reduce the routing information available to the other 
nodes 
Causes: 
 It down grade the communication 
 Effects of making the destination node 
reachable 
 
F.   Neighbor Attack 
  
     Upon receiving a packet, an intermediate node records 
its Id in the packet before forwarding the packet to the 
next node. An attacker, however, simply forwards the 
packet without recording its Id in the packet to make two 
nodes that are not within the communication range of 
each other believe that they are neighbors (i.e., one-hop 
away from each other ), resulting in a disrupted route. 
Node 
Attacker node 
(Black Hole) 
Packet sent  Initiator 
Destination 
Packet drop 
Some amount 
of data sent  
Forward 
node 
Initiator & destination 
Attacker node (rushing) 
Packet sent 
fast 
Initiator 
Destination 
Packet sent 
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Packet drop & end 
connection 
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G.    Jelly Fish Attack 
 
    A jellyfish attacker first needs to intrude into the 
multicast forwarding group. It then delays data packets 
unnecessarily for some amount of time before forwarding 
them. This results in significantly high end-to-end delay 
and thus degrades the performance of real applications. 
Causes: 
    Increase end –end delay. 
 
H.   Sybil Attack 
 
       Sybil attack manifests itself by allowing the 
malicious parties to compromise the network by 
generating and controlling large numbers of shadow 
identities. The fact is that each radio represents a single 
individual. However the broadcast nature of radio allows 
a single node to pretend to be many nodes simultaneously 
by using many different addresses while transmitting. 
The off-shoot of this Sybil attack is analyzed using 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) as the performance metric. 
Theoretical based graphs are simulated to study the 
influence of Sybil attack in PDR [18]. 
      Malicious user obtaining multiple fake identifies and 
pretends to be multiple distinct node in the system 
malicious node control the decision of the system [8]. 
The Sybil attack can be categorized into sub categories: 
presentation of multiple identities simultaneously and 
presentation of multiple identities exclusively. 
    The concept of the identifiers exists at different levels 
and because an identifier only guarantees the uniqueness 
at the intended level only. Sybil attack can be perpetrated 
from network layer and application layer where the 
respective identifiers are IP address and Node ID. Sybil 
attack can be manifested either by creating new identities 
or duplicating other identities by disabling them after 
launching a DoS attack. This mechanism can be either a 
localized or globalized one depending on the severity of 
the attack felt by neighboring nodes. Sybil attack can 
defeat the objectives of distributed environment like fair 
resource allocation, voting, routing mechanism, 
distributed storage, misbehavior detection etc. 
III.  IMPROVED MODEL (IMPACT OF RUSHING ATTACK ON 
MULTICAST IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK  
 
A. Related Work 
 
     In this related work to measure a simulation-based 
study of the effects of Rushing attacks on multicast in 
MANETs. A Rushing attacker first needs to invade into 
the multicast forwarding group in order to capture data 
packets of the multisession. If then they quickly forward 
the data packets to the next node on the routing path. This 
type of attack often results in very low Average Attack 
Success Rate [15]. 
 
B. Rushing Attack and its Impacts in Ad hoc Networks 
 
     Multicast is communication between a single sender 
and multiple receivers on a network. Otherwise it 
transmits a single message to a select group of recipients. 
On a wireless network, an adversary is able to eavesdrop 
on all messages within the emission area, by operating in 
promiscuous mode and using a packet sniffer (and 
possibly a directional antenna). Furthermore, due to the 
limitations of the medium, communications can easily be 
perturbed; MANETS are more vulnerable to attacks than 
wired networks due to open medium, dynamically 
changing network topology, cooperative algorithms, lack 
of centralized monitoring and lack of clear line of defense 
[10]. 
     Typically, multicast on-demand routing protocols state 
that nodes must forward only the first received Route 
Request from each route discovery; all further received 
Route requests are ignored. This is done in order to 
reduce cluttering. The attack consists, for the adversary, 
in quickly forwarding its Route Request messages when a 
route discovery is initiated. If the Route Requests that 
first reach the target’s neighbors are those of the attacker, 
then any discovered route includes the attacker. The 
rushing attack, that acts as an effective denial-of-service 
attack against all currently proposed on-demand ad hoc 
network routing protocols, including protocols that were 
designed to be secure. [14] In this work, to simulate three 
scenarios: 
 The attacker node is place at near sender 
 The attacker node is place at near receiver. 
 The attacker node is place anywhere within the 
network. 
 
Based on above scenarios, to simulate how the Rushing 
attack affects the network performance. 
 
C. Rushing Attack Formation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Rushing attack Formation 
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Algorithm for Rushing Attack Formation 
 
Step1: Set of N number of nodes are created. 
Step2: Create a connection between nodes. 
Step3: Rushing node invaded into the forward multicast  
             group. 
Step4: Send the packet to the particular groups 
Step5: At mean time attacker node tap all the packets.        
Step6: The packets in the attacker node are then quickly  
forwarded to the next upcoming node. 
Step7: The data packets from the legitimate node reaches  
             the destination late and so it is dropped as  
             duplicate packet.   
Step8: Rushing node in the multicast grouping, affect the  
            Avg Attack Success Rate. 
 
C       Rushing Attack Based on Three scenarios 
i. Rushing attack at near sender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Rushing Node at near Sender 
      In this figure 4 node S sends the packet to the 
destination node R. The attacker node A is placed at near 
sender. The data packets from the sender are forwarded to 
both the node A and C at the same time. The attacker 
nodes quickly forward the data packet to node E than the 
node C.  The attacker node forwards the packet to node E 
then to G and B node.  Finally Receiver R receives the 
data packets that are forwarded by attacker node. The 
performance of Attack Success Rate with respect to this 
scenario is calculated. 
Algorithm for near sender 
 
Step 1: Create a set of n number of nodes 
Step2: Create a connection between the nodes 
Step3: Invade the attacker node at near sender 
Step4: Sender sends the packet through specified path. 
Step5: Other forward nodes, forward the packet to the  
            next node. 
Step6: The attacker node taps all the packets. 
Step7: The attacker node quickly forwards the packets to  
            the next node that are closest to the receiver 
Step8: The data packets are then finally reaches the  
            destination node. 
 
 
 
ii. Rushing attack at near receiver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Rushing Node at near Receiving 
    In this figure 5 node S sends the packet to the 
destination node R. The attacker node A is placed at near 
receiver.  The sender node forwards the data packets to 
both the node B and C at the same time. The data packet 
can pass through either B, E and G nodes or C, F and G 
nodes. When the data packet reaches the attacker node A, 
it quickly forwards the data packet to node R.  The 
performance of Attack Success Rate with respect to this 
scenario is calculated. 
Algorithm for near receiver 
Step 1: Create a set of n number of nodes. 
Step2: Create a connection between the nodes. 
Step3: Invade the attacker node at near receiver. 
Step4: Sender send the packets through specified path. 
Step5: Other forward  nodes, forward the packet to the  
             next node. 
Step 6: Attacker node tap all the packets through the  
             specified path. 
Step7: The attacker node then quickly forwards the  
            packets. 
Step8: Intermediate node forwards the packets to the  
           destination node .      
 
iii. Rushing attack at anywhere within the network: 
    In this figure 5 node S sends the packet to the 
destination node R. The attacker node A is placed 
anywhere within the network. The data packet from the 
sender is forwarded to the nodes B and C. The data 
packet is then forwarded through the nodes B and E. But 
the data packet passed through the node C and then to 
attacker node A which quickly forwards the data packet 
to the node G than from the node E.  The data packet is 
then finally reaches the receiver node R through node F. 
The performance of Attack Success Rate with respect to 
this scenario is calculated. 
Algorithm for anywhere within network 
Step 1: Create a set of n number of nodes 
Step2: Create a connection between the nodes 
Step3: Invade the attacker node at anywhere within the 
           network 
S 
C 
A 
F 
E 
G B R 
S 
C 
A 
F 
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B 
R 
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Step4: Sender send the packet through specified path. 
Step5: Other forward nodes, forward the packet to the  
            next node. 
Step6: The attacker nodes tap the entire packet. 
Step7:  The attacker node then quickly forwards the  
             packets. 
Step8: The intermediate node forwards packet to the next  
            node until it reaches the   destination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Rushing Node at anywhere within the network. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Introduction 
The algorithm is evaluated against known network 
metrics and impact of rushing attack on multicast in 
mobile ad hoc network scheme specific network metrics.  
Comparison is done with rushing attacker node place at 
near sender, near receiver and uniformly distribution. 
Metrics for Evaluation: The known network metrics to be 
used for performance evaluation is packet delivery ratio. 
 Simulation Results 
We run several simulations under Linux, using the 
network simulator NS2 version ns-allinone-2.26. The 
simulation environment is composed of: 
 
 area: 500*500 meters. 
 number of nodes 50 - 100. 
 simulation duration: 1000s. 
 physical/Mac layer: IEEE 802.11 at 2Mbps, 250 
meters transmission range. 
 mobility model: random waypoint model with 
no pause time, and mode 
 movement speed 0m/s, 1m/s and 10m/s. 
 Using routing protocols are AODV and  
MAODV under NS2.26. 
 
A. Rushing attack at near sender (One sender and 5 
receivers) 
 
      When the rushing attack happens at near sender in ad 
hoc network, the attack success rate is average because it 
has to search only the intermediate node.  If there is no 
rushing attack in the network then the average attack 
success rate will be least. 
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Figure 7 Rushing attack at near sender 
 
B. Rushing Attack at Near Receiver 
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Figure 8 Rushing attack at near receiver  
 
     The figure 8 shows that the Attack Success Rate goes 
high, because of Rushing node is placed near receiver, 
because most of the forward node will contain all the 
packets. Since the attacker node is near to the receiver, it 
can gets the packet when the packet reaches the forward 
node near the receiver. Therefore, the receiver node get 
the packet quickly from the near attacker node and the 
impact of attack is highly harmful. 
 
C. Rushing Attack at Anywhere 
 
    The figure 9 shows that the Attack Success Rate goes 
least rate, because of Rushing node is placed anywhere.  
The attacker node is not placed at near sender or near    
receiver. The rushing node is placed anywhere (i.e. 
forward node in group). The forwarded node (Rushing 
attacker) taps the packet and quickly forwards the 
packets to the next node. Therefore, the chance of 
getting the packet from the attacker node depends on the 
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upcoming nodes and so the impact of attack is least 
when its compare to near receiver’s Attack Success 
Rate, is slightly higher than the near sender in which the 
Attack Success Rate is low 
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Figure 9 Rushing Attack at anywhere  
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 
A. Conclusion 
 
      The Rushing attacks are more likely to succeed in a 
multicast session where the number of multicast senders 
is small and/or the number of multicast receivers is large. 
The goal of the project is to draw the graph based on the 
rushing attack position in the network.  With respect to 
the attack positions, the best position to launch rushing 
attacks is at the near receiver, have the highest success 
rates.  The rushing attack near sender have the low 
success rate and final attack position is likely to take 
place anywhere in the network, have the least success 
rate. 
 
B. Future Directions 
 
 In this project deals with one sender and multiple 
receivers in multicast ad hoc network. Apart from 
this there are chances to enhance it to have 
multiple senders and multiple receivers in 
multicast ad hoc network. 
 In this project , it is assumed to have only one 
attacker node in the network for future it can be 
extended by adding more attacker nodes in the 
network.  
REFERENCES 
[1]  Ping Yi, Zhoulin Dai, Shiyong Zhang, Yiping Zhong, 
―A New Routing Attack in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
International Journal of Information Technology Vol. 
11 No. 2, pages 83 – 94.  
[2]  Bruschi, D. and Rosti, E., ―Secure Multicast in 
Wireless Networks of Mobile Hosts: Protocols and 
Issues‖, Mobile Networks and Applications, Volume 
7, 2002, pp 503 - 511. 
[3]  Moyer, M.J., Rao, J.R. and Rohatgi, P., ―A Survey of 
Security Issues in Multicast Communication‖,IEEE 
Network, Nov.-Dec. 1999, pp. 12 – 23. 
[4]  Dr. Jiejun Kong, ― GVG −RP: A Net-centric 
Negligibility-based Security Model for Self-
organizing Networks‖. 
[5]  S.Corson, J.Macker, ―Mobile ad hoc 
Networking(MANET):Routing Protocol Performance 
Issues and Evaluation Considerations, RFC 2501, 
January 1999. 
[6]  C. Schuba, I. Krsul, M. Kuhn, E. Spafford, A. 
Sundaram, D. Zamboni, Analysis of a Denial of 
Service Attack on TCP, Proceedings of the 1997 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 
[7]  Haining Wang, Danlu Zhang, and Kang G. Shin, 
Detecting SYN Flooding Attacks, IEEE 
INFOCOM'2002, New York City, 2002 
[8]  Jiejun Kong, Xiaoyan Hong, Mario Gerla, “ A new 
set of passive routing attacks in mobile ad hoc 
networks ―,This work is funded by MINUTEMAN 
project and related STTR project of Office of Naval 
Research Pages 1- 6. 
[9]  Jiejun Kong, Xiaoyan Hong, Mario Gerla, ― Modeling 
Ad-hoc Rushing Attack in a Negligibility-based 
Security Framework‖, September 29, 2006, Los 
Angeles, California, USA.  
[10]  Hoang Lan Nguyen , Uyen Trang Nguyen, ―A study 
of different types of attacks on multicast in mobile ad 
hoc networks‖ Ad Hoc Networks 6 (2008) pages 32–
46.  
[11]  S.J. Lee, W. Su, M. Gerla, ― On-Demand Multicast 
Routing Protocol in Multihop Wireless Mobile 
Networks ―, ACM/ Kluwer Mobile Networks and 
Applications 7 (6) (2002) 441– 453. 
[12]  Imad Aad,  Jean-Pierre Hubaux ,  Edward W. 
Knightly, ― Impact of Denial of Service Attacks on 
Ad Hoc Networks ― 
[13]  Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, ―Ariadne: A 
secure ondemand routing protocol for ad hoc 
networks,‖ in Proceedings MobiCom 2002, September 
2002. 
[14]  M. Zapata and N. Asokan, ―Securing ad hoc routing 
protocols,‖ in Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on 
Wireless Security (WiSe), 2002. 
[15]  Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, ―Efficient 
security mechanisms for routing protocols,‖ in Network 
and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS, 
2003.  
[16]   YihChun Hu,  Adrian Perrig, David B. Johnson, ―  
Rushing Attacks and Defense in Wireless Ad Hoc 
Network  Routing Protocols ―  , WiSe 2003, September 
19, 2003, San Diego California, USA Copyright 2003 
ACM.  
[17]  Yang, H., Luo, H., Ye, F., Lu, S., and Zhang, L., 
―Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Challenges and 
Solutions‖, IEEE Wireless Communications, Volume 
11, Issue 1, February 2004, pp. 38 – 47.  
[18]    Besemann, C., Kawamura, S. and Rizzo, F., 
―Intrusion    Detection System in Wireless Ad-Hoc 
Networks: Sybil Attack Detection and Others‖. 
 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, 
Vol. 4, No. 1 & 2,  2009
ISSN 1947 5500189
